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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
NASA's Constellation Program plan currently calls for the replacement of the Space Shuttle with 
the ARES I & V spacecraft and booster vehicles to send astronauts to the moon and beyond. Part 
of the ARES spacecraft is the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which includes the Crew 
Module (CM) and Service Module (SM). The Orion CM's main propulsion system and supplies 
are provided by the SM. The SM is to be processed off line and moved to the Vehicle Assembly 
Building (V AB) for stacking to the first stage booster motors prior to ARES move to the launch 
pad. The new Constellation Program philosophy to process in this manner has created a major 
task for the KSC infrastructure in that conventional QD calculations are no longer viable because 
of the location of surrounding facilities near the V AB and the Multi Purpose Processing Facility 
(MPPF), where the SM will be serviced with nearly 18,000 pounds ofhypergolic propellants. 
The Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) complex, constructed by NASA in 1994, is 
located just offE Avenue south of the Operations and Checkout (O&C) building in the Kennedy 
Space Center industrial area. The MPPF includes a high bay and a low bay. The MPPF high 
bay is 40.2 m (132 ft) long x 18.9 m (60 ft) wide with a ceiling height of 18.9 m (62 ft). The low 
bay is a 10.4 m (34 ft) long x 10.4 m (34 ft) wide processing area and has a ceiling height of6.1 
m (20 ft). The MPPF is currently used to process non-hazardous payloads. 
Engineering Analysis Inc. (EAI), under contract with ASRC Aerospace, Inc. in conjunction with 
the Explosive Safety Office, NASA, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), has carried out an analysis of 
the effects of explosions at KSC in or near various facilities produced by the spontaneous 
ignition ofhypergolic fuel stored in the CEV SM. The facilities considered included 
• Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) 
• Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) 
• Canister Rotation Facility (CRF) 
Subsequent discussion deals with the MPPF analysis. Figure 1 provides a view of the MPPF 
from the northwest. An interior view ofthe facility is shown in Figure 2. The study was 
concerned with both blast hazards and hazardous fragments which exceed existing safety 
standards, as described in Section 2.0. The analysis included both blast and fragmentation 
effects and was divided into three parts as follows: 
• blast 
• primary fragmentation 
• secondary fragmentation 
Blast effects are summarized in Section 3.0, primary fragmentation in Section 4.0, and secondary 
fragmentation (internal and external) in Section 5.0. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.0, 
while references cited are included in Section 7.0. A more detailed description of the entire 
study is available in a separate document [1]. The study conformed to certain guidelines 
specified by NASNKSC [2]. 
* Numbers in brackets refer to references cited as presented in Section 7.0. 
Figure 1. Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) 
/ 
Figure 2. CEV 606 Short Stack Surrounded By Access Stand Positioned Within MPPF Highbay 
2.0 SAFETY STANDARDS 
Relevant safety standards [3 - 6] specify overpressure limits for inhabited buildings from 0.9 to 
1.2 psi. Likewise, for fragmentation hazards, fragment impact energies in excess of 58 ft-Ib[, in 
number densities greater than 1 per 600 square feet, (as measured in a vertical plane one foot 
wide extending from ground level up to an elevation of 6 feet) are considered hazardous. For a 
building containing explosives with a TNT equivalence on the order of 1000 Ibm, the inhabited 
building distance is 1250 feet from the perimeter of the building. Figure 3 provides a plan view 
of the explosive safety arc and nearby KSC structures. 
3.0 BLAST EFFECTS 
The hypergolic fuel contained within the CEV Service Module with a total mass (including 20% 
design growth margin) of21,591Ibs, was assumed to detonate with anJequivalent yield of 1080 
lbs of TNT. The CEV was positioned in the Access Stand within the MPPF high bay, as shown 
in Figure 4. All relevant components of the MPPF, both internal and external, were included in 
the analysis, along with all significant surrounding structures within a range of 1250 feet, or 
slightly further, from the MPPF. Blast effects were computed by means of the HEXDAM 
software [7]. Five views of the undamaged MPPF structure, as generated by HEXDAM, are 
presented in Figures 5 through 9. The corresponding five views of the MPPF with blast damage 
are presented in Figures 10 through 15. As indicated in these last five figures, severe blast 
damage was predicted to much of the roof, as well as all four faces ofthe MPPF. 
With regard to overpressure predictions, both 0.9 and 1.2 psi horizontal contour plots were 
generated at eight different elevations, ranging from 0 to 70 feet. The maximum ranges for such 
contours occurred at 50 feet, as shown in Figure 16. As indicated in this figure, the 1.2 psi 
overpressure contour extended out no more than 355 feet from the MPPF perimeter while the 0.9 
psi overpressure contour extended out no more than 436 feet. The results indicated significant 
hazard to the MPPF itself but no significant hazards to the surrounding buildings would result 
from blast effects. A summary of blast hazards is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of MPPF Blast Hazards 
FACILITY #/NAME HAZARDS 
M7 -11 04/MPPF High Bay 
M7-1104/MPPF North Office 
M7 -11 04/MPPF Low Bay 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Flight Data Control Room 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Annex 
M7-1357IMulti Operations Support Bldg (MOSB) 
M7-1354/Payload Hazardous Servicing Facility (PHSF) Bldg 
M7-1355/PHSF Storage Bay 
M7 -1 059/Hypergolic Maintenance Facility 
M7-0777/Canister Rotation Facility - High Bay 
M7-0777/Canister Rotation Facility - Office Area 
Moderate-to-Severe 
N one-to-Severe 
N one-to-Severe 
Slight-to-Severe 
None-to-Severe 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None 
Figure 3. KSC Buildings in Vicinity ofMPPF 
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Figure 4. MPPF Plan View 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
I I I 
I 
I 
I I I 
; 
J I 
, 
, 
I 
I 
, . 
, 
I , 
. 
, 
Figure 5. MPPF Roof 
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Figure 6. MPPF North Face 
Figure 7. MPPF East Face 
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Figure 8. MPPF South Face 
Figure 9. MPPF West Face 
Figure 10. Damage Plot, MPPF Roof 
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Figure 11. Damage Plot, MPPF North Face 
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Figure 12. Damage Plot, MPPF East Face 
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Figure 13 . Damage Plot, MPPF South Face 
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Figure 14. Damage Plot, MPPF West Face 
LEGEND 
• no damage 
slight damage 
moderate damage 
• severe dama2:e 
-I I I 1:lII ~ 
15 00 M7-0777' Note: Grid Spacing = 100 FT 
~ ..-
-
........ 
- I,.;- ...... 
- 1250 ft 00 /' ~ !/ r"... Standoff / 
" / 
, stance 
10 
1/ ,~ 
00 / \ I , 5 
I \ 
I , 
-,-~, .<,' 
0 ~ - "...2. ---- ~ If!:I 
'\ 
MPp/T M7-1059 
\ , 
\ I 
-5 00 \ / 
\. / 
I\. / 
-10 00 
, 
./ 
'" 
~ 
.......... V Ouerpifii~;Wrv • 
........ 
..... 
.,. ~ ~M7-1357 ~iJlirr·* Z) 
>9 .00E-Ol 
-150 0 .. 
• 
>1 .2OE +00 
M7-1354/ r.. ~M7-1355 -
-I 
L!J-
-1500 o 500 1000 1500 -1000 -500 
Figure 15. Horizontal Contour Plot, Overpressure (0.9 and 1.2 psi) Elevation 0 Ft. 
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Figure 16. Horizontal Contour Plot, Overpressure (0.9 and 1.2 psi) Elevation 50 Ft. 
4.0 PRIMARY FRAGMENTATION 
The aluminum components within the CEV Service Module and Spacecraft Adapter were treated 
as a hollow cylinder which was the source of all primary fragments produced by the explosion. 
Characteristics of this cylindrical approximation are given in Table 2. Analyses of 88 different 
fragment paths were carried out by means of the PriFrag software [8]. A fragment drag 
coefficient of 1.2 was used in this analysis. The results indicated that 19.27% of the fragment 
paths were blocked by MPPF internal structures but the remaining primary fragments would 
impact and penetrate the MPPF wall at an elevation of approximately 18 feet. Such primary 
fragments were characterized by impact energies and number densities (as measured in a one-
foot wide vertical plane extending from ground level up to an elevation of 6 feet), which 
remained hazardous at ranges out to 898 feet beyond the MPPF perimeter, as shown in Figure 
17. These primary fragments appear to represent the most significant hazard to most 
surrounding buildings. A summary of primary fragmentation hazards is provided in Table 3. 
Table 2. Cylindrical Approximation of CEV 606 Service Module and 
Space Craft Adapter for Primary Fragmentation 
\#." 
Cylinder Outside Diameter (ft) 
Cylinder Height (ft) 
Cylinder Wall Thickness (ft) 
Cylinder Composition 
Cylinder Mass (Ibm) 
Spacecraft Adapter 
Service Module (.65 x 4780) 
18.223 
16.8 
0.0366 
Aluminum 
2837.84 
3107.00 
Total 5944.84 
Table 3. Summary of MPPF Primary Fragmentation Hazards 
FACILITY #INAME 
M7 -11 04IMPPF High Bay 
M7-1104IMPPF North Office 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Low Bay 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Flight Data Control Room 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Annex 
M7-1357IMulti Operations Support Bldg (MOSB) 
M7-1354IPayload Hazardous Servicing Facility (PHSF) Bldg 
M7-1355/PHSF Storage Bay 
M7-1059/Hypergolic Maintenance Facility 
M7-0777/Canister Rotation Facility - High Bay 
M7 -0777 ICanister Rotation Facility - Office Area 
HAZARDS 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
None-to-Slight 
In carrying out this primary fragmentation analysis a discrepancy in the value of fragment drag 
coefficient was detected and corrected. This discrepancy resulted from the fact that in certain 
standard references [6, 9-14] a value of 0.6 (instead of 1.2) was recommended for primary 
fragment drag coefficient. This value, however, was based on a nonstandard definition of drag, 
in which a factor of one-half had been omitted. In two earlier studies of explosions in the MPPF 
[15, 16] this smaller value had been used, resulting in the prediction of significantly greater 
hazardous primary fragmentation ranges. 
5.0 SECONDARY FRAGMENTATION 
The secondary (internal) fragments were produced by the interaction of the blast wave inside the 
MPPF high bay interacting with the CEV Access Stand. The generation of secondary (internal) 
fragments is very dependent on the composition and configuration of the internal structures 
within the MPPF High Bay. Because of their proximity to the explosion, secondary (internal) 
fragments tend to be more energetic then secondary (external) fragments, which tend to be more 
removed from the explosion. The HEXFRAG software [17] was used to carry out the analysis 
along the 21 different fragment paths, shown in Figure 18. Along 3 of the paths the secondary 
(internal) fragments impacting the MPPF wall did not possess hazardous impact energies and 
could not penetrate the MPPF wall. Fragments along the remaining 18 paths did possess 
hazardous impact energy, and their impact velocity was sufficient to penetrate the MPPF wall. 
The secondary (external) fragments were produced by the interaction of the blast wave with the 
external frangible components of the MPPF high bay, where moderate or severe damage was 
produced. For purposes of the secondary (external) fragmentation analysis, the MPPF wall was 
assumed to consist of a sheet of corrugated steel. The HEXFRAG software was used with this 
assumption to carry out the analysis along the same 21 fragment paths previously noted. 
The results from the HEXFRAG runs for the secondary (internal) fragments were combined with 
the secondary (external) fragment results to obtain the total secondary fragment hazardous 
ranges. As shown in Figure 19, such ranges extended out no more than 420 feet beyond the 
MPPF perimeter. Such fragments appear to pose a significant hazard to the MPPF itself but no 
hazard to any nearby KSC structures. A summary of secondary fragmentation hazards is 
provided in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary ofMPPF Secondary Fragmentation Hazards 
FACILITY #INAME 
M7 -11 04/MPPF High Bay 
M7-II04IMPPF North Office 
M7 -11 04/MPPF Low Bay 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Flight Data Control Room 
M7 -11 04IMPPF Annex 
M7-I3571Multi Operations Support Bldg (MOSB) 
M7 -1 354/Payload Hazardous Servicing Facility (PHSF) Bldg 
M7-I355/PHSF Storage Bay 
M7 -1 059IHypergolic Maintenance Facility 
M7-0777/Canister Rotation Facility - High Bay 
M7-0777/Canister Rotation Facility - Office Area 
HAZARDS 
Severe 
Moderate-to-Severe 
Moderate-to-Severe 
Moderate-to-Severe 
Moderate-to-Severe 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
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Figure 17. Primary Hazardous Fragment Range Distribution 
Figure 18. Secondary Fragment Paths for MPPF 
' . . 
-I I I I JIlt f f f f f f f 11 I I I Iff f_ f-
1500 M7-0777 Note : Grid Spacing = 100 FT - f-
1000 
- ~ ~ ..... ...... ...... I I I 
-
~N v ....... 1250 ft. 
/ t'-.. 
/ "- Standoff / \. r-.. / Distance 
1vfaximum SecondalY -1/ "\ 
500 / Hazardous Fragment t\ I Range at Ground Level \ 
~ / 
/' 
... 
..... 
/ 
.= ~q IE' ~PF .~ - J Ml-IO o 59 
-500 1\ I \ 
1\ / 
, 
"' v 
-1000 " " 
" ............. .,/ ... , 
..... 
--- -
,. Ml-1357 
-1500 
M7-1354 ..... ~ f I I 
• 
~M7-135 5 
- 51)0 -1000 -500 ( . 00 1000 15( 10 
Figure 19. Secondary Hazardous Fragment Range Distribution 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the results of the analyses described in Section 2.0 through 5.0, the following 
conclusions are reached: 
1) Blast hazards are limited primarily to the MPPF. 
2) Primary fragment hazards represent the greatest concern to surrounding KSC 
buildings with ranges extending out to 898 feet beyond the MPPF perimeter. 
Secondary hazardous fragment ranges extend out no more than 420 feet and pose minimal hazard 
to nearby KSC structures. 
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